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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The first attempt to launch Space Shuttle Discovery was made on April 10, 1990.
The countdown proceeded without problems until approximately 4 minutes before liftoff,
when 1 of the 3 Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) exhibited a speed control problem.
Technicians determined that there was a blowing leak through the APU #1 Pulse
Control Valve. The defective APU was replaced on the pad (which was a first). STS-31
launch was rescheduled for April 24, 1990.
On April 24, 1990, the launch countdown proceeded on schedule to the terminal
phase at the T-31 second mark, when the liquid oxygen fill and drain valve in the
Orbiter Main Propulsion System (MPS) was determined to be in the wrong position for
launch. Countdown was automatically held at T-31 seconds until the console operator
repositioned the valve. Discovery was launched satisfactorily at 8:33:51 a.m. Eastern
Daylight Time (EDT).
All systems performed well, and the Hubble Space Telescope was released 330
nautical miles above the Earth. This was the highest altitude that the Space Shuttle had
ever flown. Hubble is an optical, spectrographic, and photometric observatory system
designed for extended orbital operation and will provide images of planets, asteroids,
and comets. These images will be of significantly higher resolution than can be achieved
with earthbound telescope systems and will enable significant data gathering on celestial
systems in the outer expanses of the universe.
After 5 days in orbit, Discovery touched down on Edwards Air Force Base concrete
runway 22 at 9:49 a.m. EDT, April 29, 1990. Plans to land on the lakebed runway had
to be abandoned because of high winds. Descent took approximately 15 minutes longer
than usual because of the record-breaking altitude for the STS-31 mission.
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FOREWORD
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) is a National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) Headquarters Safety Division, Code QS produced document
that is prepared for use by the NASA Associate Administrator, Office of Safety and
Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director prior to each Space
Shuttle flight. The intent of the MSE is to document safety risk factors that represent a
change, or potential change, to the risk baselined by the Program Requirements Control
Board (PRCB) in the Space Shuttle Hazard Reports (HRs). Unresolved safety risk
factors impacting STS-31 flight were also documented prior to the STS-31 Flight
Readiness Review (FRR) (FRR Edition), the STS-31 Launch Minus Two Day (L-2)
Review (L-2 Edition), and prior to the STS-31 Launch Minus One Day (L-l) Review
(L-1 Update). This final Postflight Edition evaluates performance against safety risk
factors identified in the previous MSE editions for this mission.
The MSE is published on a mission-by-mission basis for use in the FRR and is
updated for the L-1 Review. For tracking and archival purposes, the MSE is issued in
final report format after each Space Shuttle flight.
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SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Purpose
The Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) provides the Associate Administrator, Office
of Safety and Mission Quality (OSMQ), and the Space Shuttle Program Director with
the NASA Headquarters Safety Division position on changes, or potential changes, to
the Program safety risk baseline approved in the formal Failure Modes and Effects
Analysis/Critical Items List (FMEA/CIL) and Hazard Analysis process. While some
changes to the baseline since the previous flight are included to highlight their
significance in risk level change, the primary purpose is to ensure that changes which
were too late to include in formal changes through the FMEA/CIL and Hazard Analysis
process are documented along with the safety position, which includes the acceptance
rationale.
1.2 Scope
This report addresses STS-31 safety risk factors that represent a change from
previous flights, factors from previous flights that had an impact on this flight, and
factors that were unique to this flight.
Factors listed in the MSE are essentially limited to items that affect, or have the
potential to affect, Space Shuttle safety risk factors and have been elevated to Level I
for discussion or approval. These changes are derived from a variety of sources such as
issues, concerns, problems, and anomalies. It is not the intent to attempt to scour lower
level files for items dispositioned and closed at those levels and report them here; it is
assumed that their significance is such that Level I discussion or approval is not
appropriate for them. Items against which there is clearly no safety impact or potential
concern were not reported here, although items that were evaluated at some length and
found not to be a concern were reported as such. NASA Safety Reporting System
(NSRS) issues were considered along with the other factors, but may not be specifically
identified as such.
Data gathering is a continuous process. However, collating and focusing of MSE
data for a specific mission begins prior to the mission Launch Site Flow Review (LSFR)
and continues through the flight and return of the Orbiter to Kennedy Space Center
(KSC). For archival purposes, the MSE is updated subsequent to the mission to add
items identified too late for inclusion in the prelaunch report and to document
performance of the anomalous systems for possible future use in safety evaluations.
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1.3 Organization
The MSE is presented in eight sections as follows:
Section 1 - Provides brief introductory remarks, including purpose, scope,
and organization.
Section 2 Provides a summary description of the STS-31 mission,
including launch data, crew size, mission duration, launch and
landing sites, and other mission- and payload-related
information.
Section 3 Contains a list of safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved
or not a safety concern prior to STS-31 launch, that were
impacted or repeated by anomalies reported for the STS-31
flight.
Section 4 Contains a list of safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-31.
Section 5 - Contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) that developed
during the STS-36 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight.
Section 6 - Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-33
mission, the previous flight of the Orbiter vehicle (OV-103).
Section 7 Contains a list of IFAs that developed during the STS-31
mission. Those IFAs that are considered to represent safety
risks will be addressed in the MSE for the next Space Shuttle
flight.
Section 8 Contains background and historical data on the issues,
problems, concerns, and anomalies addressed in Sections 3
through 7. This section is not normally provided as part of the
MSE, but is available upon request. It contains (in notebook
format) presentation data, white papers, and other
documentation. These data were used to support the
resolution rationale or retention of open status for each item
discussed in the MSE.
Appendix A - Provides a list of acronyms used in this report.
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SECTION 2
STS-31 MISSION SUMMARY
2.1 Summary Description of the STS-31 Mission
The first attempt to launch Space Shuttle Discovery was made on April 10, 1990.
The countdown proceeded without problems until approximately 4 minutes before liftoff,
when 1 of the 3 Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) exhibited a speed control problem.
Technicians determined that there was a blowing leak through the APU #1 Pulse
Control Valve. After the defective APU was replaced on the pad (which was a first)
and the Hubble Space Telescope (HST) Nickel-Hydrogen batteries were recharged, the
launch was rescheduled for April 24, 1990.
On April 24, 1990, the launch countdown proceeded on schedule to the terminal
phase at the T-31 second mark, when the liquid oxygen fill and drain valve in the
Orbiter Main Propulsion System was determined to be in the wrong position for launch.
The countdown was automatically held at the T-31 seconds until the console operator
repositioned the valve and the mission was cleared for launch. Space Shuttle Discovery
lifted off Pad 39B at 8:33:51 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT). All systems performed
well as Discovery reached an altitude of 330 nautical miles (nmi), the highest altitude the
Space Shuttle had ever flown.
The first day in orbit was spent preparing the HST for deployment. Power was
supplied to the Remote Manipulator System (RMS) at T+2 hours 54 minutes, and
checkout of the RMS subsystems and operating modes began. The black-and-white
camera at the end of the manipulator arm was used to examine Hubble for any damage
that might have occurred during the launch. After the post-ascent checkout was
completed, preparations for a possible space walk began. Two crewmembers started
breathing 100% oxygen from their helmet assemblies while the orbiter cabin pressure
was dropped from 14.7 to 10.2 pounds per square inch (psi). The "prebreathing"
procedure is used to shorten the time required to prepare for a spacewalk if trouble
with Hubble developed. Umbilical power to Hubble was activated at approximately
4-1/2 hours into the mission. Commands to turn on the Hubble transmitters were sent
at 13:21 EDT. Checkout continued through the night.
At the beginning of Flight Day (FD) 2, HST deployment operations went well
initially. The first sign of trouble occurred when Hubble's 2 solar arms failed to trip
microswitches that signal full deployment. The left-hand solar panel unreeled as
planned. Then the right-hand array unlatched, rolled out a single segment on each side,
and stopped. Engineers at Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) decided to disable the
warning system and attempt to deploy the array a third time. This time, the array
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unfurled until it unreeled to its full length. At 15:37 EDT the crew released the
manipulator arm's grip on Hubble.
On FD 3, the Orbiter was positioned in a gravity gradient attitude with the nose
pointing toward Earth and the open payload bay doors facing north. The purpose of
this position was to test the Orbiter's ability to maintain a stable attitude using the
influence of gravity rather than the Reaction Control System (RCS) thrusters. Before
the end of FD 3, a small RCS burn was completed that moved Discovery within 40 nmi
of Hubble by wakeup time on FD 4. Prior to the burn, Discovery was trailing Hubble by
approximately 54 nautical miles.
On FD 4, the HST aperture door was opened. If the door failed to reach its full
105 ° position, 2 crewmembers stood by to perform a space walk to manually open the
door. The first attempt to open the aperture door was unsuccessful, because the on-
board computer placed Hubble in an inertial hold-safe mode. This safe mode was
triggered when the computer detected problems with the high-gain antenna. A second
attempt to open the door began at 09:46 EDT. Seventeen minutes later, the aperture
door was opened. Mission Control released the crew from escort duty although
problems with Hubble's high-gain antennas continued. The crew was trained to support
deployment activities, but an unscheduled repair call was not on the agenda. Houston
wanted to preserve the supply of "consumables" - oxygen, food, and maneuvering fuel -
to accommodate for weather-related landing delays.
On FD 5, the astronauts prepared for landing. Flight Control System (FCS)
checkout and hot-fire test of the RCS thrusters were conducted. During FCS checkout,
the crew members started an APU; configured the hydraulic system for reentry;
examined the guidance sensor systems; and tested Discovery's speed brake, rudder,
elevons, and body flap. During these tests, a fuel pump heater failed on APU #3; the
crew switched to the backup heater which operated satisfactorily for the remainder of
the STS-31 mission.
On FD 6, Discovery landed at Edwards Air Force Base at 9:49 a.m. EDT. At
08:37:26 EDT, as Discovery passed over southern Africa, the 2 Orbital Maneuvering
System (OMS) engines were fired for approximately 4 minutes, 48 seconds to slow the
vehicle for reentry. At 09:19:21 EDT, over the Pacific Ocean, "Entry Interface"
occurred, with the Orbiter travelling at a velocity of 24,700 feet per second. The period
of maximum heating during reentry occurred approximately 10 minutes later, soon after
the Orbiter had passed north of Hawaii. As Discovery slowed to Mach 1, the crew took
over control manually for the final portion of the landing. Discovery landed on concrete
runway 22 after a flight of 5 days, 1 hour, 16 minutes, 6 seconds. Plans to land on a
lakebed runway had to be abandoned because of high winds. Descent took
approximately 15 minutes longer than usual because of the record-breaking altitude for
the STS-31 mission.
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2.2 Flight/Vehicle Data
Launch Date: April 24, 1990
Launch Time: 8:31 a.m. EDT
Launch Site: KSC Pad 39B
RTLS: Kennedy Space Center, Runway 33
TAL Site: Banjul, The Gambia
Alternate TAL Site: Ben Guerir, Morocco
Landing Site: Edwards AFB, CA, Concrete Runway 22
Landing Date: April 29, 1990
Landing Time: 9:49 a.m. EDT
Mission Duration: 5 Days, 1 Hour, 16 Minutes
Crew Size: 5
Inclination: 28.5 Degrees
Altitude: 330 Nautical Miles Circular/Direct Insertion
Orbiter: OV-103 (10)Discovery
SSMEs: (1) #2011, (2) #2031, (3) #2107
ET: ET-34
SRBs: BI-037
SRMs: RSRM Flight Set #10
MLP #2
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ENGINE #2011 #2031 #2107
POWERHEAD #2016 #2028 #2014
MCC* #4005 #2019 #4002
NOZZLE #4016 #4017 #4019
CONTROLLER F24 F27 F25
FASCOS* #17 #12 #29
HPFTP* #5203R1 #6102R1 #4011R1
LPFTP* #2030 #2120R 1 #4007
HPOTP* #2027R 1 #4008R 1 #2226R 1
LPOTP* #2126 #2120 #4105
* Acronyms can be found in Appendix A.
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2.2.1 Remote Manipulator System End Effector Modification
The Remote Manipulator System was the primary deployment method for the
Hubble Space Telescope. A new configuration End Effector was the interfacing
mechanism used to grapple and deploy the HST. This was the first flight with the
modified, -7 configuration end effector. Modifications made reduce the number of Crit
1 failure modes, improve performance, and extend the useable life before refurbishment.
To eliminate 6 Crit 1 failure modes, a test connector was added to enable testing of end
effector electronic unit fuses and built-in test equipment, brake and clutch enable
signals, and heater buses. The previous end effector configuration was susceptible to
failure under the launch vibration environment. The end effector carriage-to-frame
interface was strengthened by replacing the roller bearing with preloaded slider blocks.
These blocks hold the carriage to the frame during launch and reduce vibration effects.
Wear on the end effector brakes and clutches required refurbishment after 5 or 6 flights.
Modifications to increase brake slip torque (from 35 to 85 ounces) and clutch slip torque
(from 35 to 45 ounces) have been made to reduce slipping revolutions. A modification
was also made to clutches and brakes to contain friction material debris formed during
operation. These modifications increased the useful end effector life between
refurbishment to 30 flights.
2.2.2 Carbon Brakes
OV-103/STS-31 was the first flight using carbon brakes on the main landing gear.
Carbon brakes are replacing the carbon-lined beryllium brakes used on all Orbiters since
the beginning of the Space Shuttle Program. Improved performance margins which
lower the safety risk during landings, extended life, and elimination of special handling
procedures were the prime reasons for making this change. STS-31 was selected for
carbon brake system first flight because needed instrumentation is available on OV-103.
The carbon brake assembly comprises 5 rotors and 4 stators, increased from 4 and 3
respectfully, to increase the friction/braking area. The beryllium brake assemblies have
carbon liners fastened to beryllium rotors which further reduce the available rotor
friction area. One-piece carbon rotors are used in the improved carbon brake assembly.
Hydraulic pressure regulation is reduced by 500 psi with the carbon brakes; operating
pressure is 2000 psi. Energy absorption capability of the carbon brakes increases from
the 18,000,000 foot-pounds (ft-lb) of the beryllium brakes to 82,000,000 ft-lb. This added
capability provides a nominal brake life of over 20 landings/stops; much improved over
the 5 maximum of the beryllium brakes. This extra energy absorption capability allows
an increase in nominal landing speed from 180 knots to 225 knots, lowering the risk
associated with Return-To-Launch-Site contingency landings at Kennedy Space Center.
In addition to increased performance and extended useful life, elimination of the
beryllium brakes decreases the health risks to technicians; beryllium is a highly toxic
element.
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2.2.3 Highest Orbit Mission
STS-31 was the highest orbit mission of the Space Shuttle Program. A question
recently raised concerning the capability to deorbit after an OMS propellant tank failure
again brought to light the increased risk of high-orbit missions. Because of the extended
OMS-1 and OMS-2 burns required to achieve a 330 nautical mile (nmi) circular orbit,
OMS engine propellant reserves are depleted to a point that subsequent loss of access to
OMS propellant (fuel or oxidizer in either OMS Pod) would leave insufficient propellant
to accomplish deorbit. This is a known condition and is an accepted risk in flying high-
orbit missions. The issue of sufficient OMS propellant can become a concern at any
altitude. Prelaunch quantity, fuel usage, mission profile (including payload deployment
maneuvers and rendezvous), payload mass, and center of gravity maintenance can vary
and influence propellant reserves. OMS propellant tanks are made of titanium and
operate at a maximum pressure of 313 psi. All tanks are proof-pressure tested prior to
installation and leak checked prior to each flight. Tank fracture control requirements
require tank proof-pressure testing to be accomplished after 5 flights to protect against
possible crack initiation, growth, and tank rupture. There have been no propellant tank
failures in flight. The STS-31 OMS propellant tanks successfully passed all acceptance
and proof tests required by the tank fracture control plan.
2.3 Payload Data
Payload Bay:
Q
Middeck:
Hubble Space Telescope (HST)
IMAX Cargo Bay Camera (ICBC) System (IMAX-04)
Ascent Particle Monitor (APM) (Get-Away Special)
IMAX In-Cabin Camera System (IMAX-04)
Protein Crystal Growth (PCG)
Air Force Maui Optical Station (AMOS) Calibration Test
Radiation Monitoring Equipment (RME)
Investigations into Polymer Membrane Processing (IPMP)
Investigation of Arc and Ion Behavior in Microgravity
(SE 82-16 Ion Arc)
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2.4 Hubble Space Telescope Description.
The HST primary objective is to provide a high resolution, optical telescope system
that will see planets, asteroids, and comets so clearly that the scientific data recorded
will significantly extend the knowledge of the universe. The HST is comprised of 3
major elements: the Optical Telescope Assembly (OTA), the Support System Module
(SSM), and a set of Scientific Instruments (SI). The HST is deployed by the RMS. The
HST does not have a propulsion system. Attitude control is provided by reaction wheels
and magnetic torquers.
The OTA is a 2.4 meter, f/24, Ritchey-Chretien Cassegrain-type telescope with a
usable Field-Of-View (FOV) of 14 arc minutes half-angle. The focal plane is divided
among 4 axial Sis and 1 radial SI, 3 optical control sensors, and 3 Fine Guidance
Sensors (FGSs). The OTA major elements include the primary mirror and main ring,
providing the primary structural interface to the SSM; the focal plane structure,
supporting the Sis and FGSs; the main and secondary light baffles for stray light
absorption; the metering truss and secondary mirror; and the OTA Equipment Section
(ES), housing most of the OTA electronics. The ES mounts to the exterior SSM ES.
An SSM equipment shelf is provided with the focal plane structure for Fixed Head Star
Tracker (FHST) and Rate Sensor Unit (RSU) mounting. All focal plane sensors, as
well as the majority of the OTA electronics, are Orbital Replaceable Units (ORUs).
Supporting all other elements of the vehicle, the SSM is the spacecraft portion of
the HST. It provides all interfaces to the Orbiter. The SSM contains a very precise
pointing and stabilization control subsystem, thermal control subsystem, data
management subsystem, and electrical power and communications subsystem. The
electrical power required to operate the HST is provided by batteries, recharged and
supplemented by Solar Array (SA) blankets during the sunlit portion of its orbit. The
major structural components of the SSM are the Aperture Door (AD), the Light Shield
(LS) and Forward Shell (FS) (enclosing the OTA), the SSM ES (housing the module
subsystems and providing the primary HST load-bearing structure), and the Aft Shroud
(AS) (enclosing the Sis, FGSs, and FHSTs). The SSM also provides structural and
electrical interfaces to the GSFC Hight Support System (FSS). Electrical interface to
the Orbiter is provided via the AS.
The initial complement of Sis on the HST includes 2 imaging cameras,
2 spectrographs, 1 photometer, and the OTA FGSs used as astrometry Sis. The Faint
Object Camera (FOC) and High Resolution Spectrograph (HRS) are mounted in the
axial position of the OTA focal plane structure. The Wide Field/Planetary Camera
(WF/PC) is radially mounted in the OTA, as are the FGSs. All Sis and FGSs are
ORUs.
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SECTION 3
SAFETY RISK FACTORS/ISSUES IMPACTED BY STS-31 ANOMALIES
This section lists safety risk factors/issues, considered resolved (or not a safety
concern) for STS-31 prior to launch (see Sections 4, 5, 6, and 7), that were repeated or
related to anomalies that occurred during the STS-31 flight. The list indicates the
section of this Mission Safety Evaluation (MSE) Report in which the item is addressed,
the item designation (Element/Number) within that section, a description of the item,
and brief comments concerning the anomalous condition that was reported.
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ITEM COMMENT
Section 5:
Orbiter 3
Orbiter 7
STS-36 lnflight Anomalies
Reaction Control System
(RCS) Thruster R3D failed
off during External Tank
(ET) separation.
(IFA No. STS-36-04)
Water Spray Boiler (WSB)
#2 vent system "A" heater
failed.
(IFA No. STS-36-07)
Two RCS thruster anomalies were
reported on STS-31. Thruster L3A
failed "off' during post-Main Engine
Cutoff (MECO), Main Propulsion
System (MPS) dump, +X maneuver; the
oxidizer injector valve did not open.
Approximately 7 hours after this failure,
thruster L3A oxidizer temperature
dropped from 90°F to 21"F, indicating
that the oxidizer injector valve was
leaking. These failures were similar to
thruster anomalies experienced on
STS-5, STS-29, and STS-30. The failure
mechanism was attributed to nitrate
formation/contamination of the oxidizer
valve pilot poppet.
Expedited procurement is in process for
a universal throat plug designed to
eliminate the potential for water
intrusion into RCS thrusters. (See
Section 7, Orbiter 2 for more details.)
(IFA No. STS-31-03A and STS-31-03B)
While on-orbit and during STS-36 entry,
WSB #2 vent system heater "A"
operated erratically. WSB controller
testing at the vendor failed to duplicate
the anomaly. This was a repeat of IFA
No. STS-34-18, which was closed as
unexplained because it could not be
repeated. Troubleshooting of the STS-
34 anomaly included operation of "A"
and "B" heaters for a number of cycles
and shaking of wiring and connectors.
STS-31 WSB #2A heater operated
erratically before launch and failed to
respond when power was applied on-
orbit. WSB #2B heater was turned on
and functioned properly for the
remainder of the mission. Heater "A"
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ITEM
Section 5:STS-36 lnflight Anomalies
Orbiter 7
(Continued)
COMMENT
was reselected for entry; operated slower
than normal in increasing temperature,
and cycled irregularly. Postflight
temperature profile tests at Kennedy
Space Center (KSC) found tiles in
contact with the WSB vent nozzle; the
tiles acted as heat sinks. Previous
failures also occurred on STS-33 and
STS-34.
(IFA No. STS-31-05)
SRB 6 Right Solid Rocket Booster
(SRB) frustrum Marshall
Trowellable Ablator No. 2
(MTA-2) debonds.
(IFA No. STS-36-B-07)
During postflight inspection of the right
SRB frustrum, MTA-2 debonds were
found at 16 ramp locations. The voids
occurred between MTA-2 layers.
Material analyses performed on MTA-2
sections removed from 2 fasteners found
that the voids were air bubbles
introduced during material application;
these voids were too small to initiate
loss of MTA-2. As a corrective action,
MTA-2 processing enhancements are
being evaluated.
This was the first instance of an MTA-2
debond since it was first used. Evidence
indicated that the debonds occurred
during or after frustrum separation.
Postflight assessment of STS-31 found
missing Thermal Protection System
(TPS) material on the left-hand aft skirt.
Areas with missing TPS material were
either missing K5NA over MTA-2 or
MTA-2 over MTA-2 applications. It was
determined that the loss of MTA-2 on
STS-31 occurred during descent or at
water impact. (See Section 7, SRB 4 for
details.)
(IFA No. STS-31-B-04)
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ITEM
Section 6:STS-33 Inflight Anomalies
Orbiter 10 Erratic temperature
indications from Auxiliary
Power Unit (APU) #1 and
#3 bypass line "A".
(IFA No. STS-33-16)
COMMENT
Bypass line "A" temperature sensors on
both APU #1 and #3 demonstrated.
erratic behavior. This was indicated by
erratic bypass line heater operation.
The temperature sensors, or thermostats,
are mounted on the APU bypass lines.
It is believed that these lines
experienced vibration which led to
loosening of the sensor mounts.
APU #3 fuel pump bypass heater "A"
failed "on" during Flight Control System
(FCS) checkout prior to STS-31 reentry.
This heater operated erratically during
STS-33, but a decision was made not to
replace the thermostat prior to STS-31.
Therefore, this anomaly was expected.
(See Section 7, Orbiter 6 for details.)
(IFA No. STS-31-08)
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SECTION 4
RESOLVED STS-31 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
This section contains a summary of the safety risk factors that were considered
resolved for STS-31. These items were reviewed by the NASA safety community. A
description and information regarding problem resolution are provided for each safety
risk factor. The safety position with respect to resolution is based on findings resulting
from System Safety Review Panel (SSRP) and Program Requirements Control Board
(PRCB) reviews (or other special panel findings, etc.). It represents the safety
assessment arrived at in accordance with actions taken, efforts conducted, and
tests/retests and inspections performed to resolve each specific problem.
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SECTION 4 INDEX
RESOLVED STS-31 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
RISK
FACTOR
INTEORATIQN
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
STS-34 Auxiliary Power Unit fuel pump carbon bearing crack.
Main Propulsion System to Main Engine #2, engine #2031, 12" seal
leak.
Failure of Snap-On torque wrench.
Difference between the Primary Flight Software and Backup Flight
Software could lead to recontact between the Orbiter and External
Tank after separation.
Contamination in OV-102 Hydrogen system lines.
Solid Rocket Booster Rate Gyro Assembly workmanship and
inspection discrepancies.
External Tank Liquid Oxygen outboard elbow heater short.
PAGE
4-4
4-6
4-6
4-8
4-9
4-10
4-12
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Metal chips found in the carbon brake assembly (OV-103).
Reaction Control System thruster weld issue.
Elevon cove leak test failure on STS-31.
Fuel Cell separator plate plating defects.
OV-103/STS-31 right-hand main landing gear upstop tripod assembly
problem.
OV-103 aft fuselage hydraulic fluid leak.
OV-103 Auxiliary Power Unit #3 turbine wheel limited-life issue.
Nose wheel bearing retainer nut issue.
Potential for untempered martensite in the Nose Landing Gear axle
housing.
STS-31 left-hand Nose Landing Gear tire leak rate.
4-13
4-14
4-15
4-16
4-17
4-18
4-19
4-20
4-23
4-27
SSME
2
3
4
5
6
7
Space Shuttle Main Engine High-Pressure Fuel duct weld proof-
pressure test failure issue.
Uralite in G-15 joint on engine #2031, nozzle #4017.
A dent was found in feedline #2 on engine #2031 prior to STS-33.
Space Shuttle Main Engine Controller software anomaly.
Eccentric ring fold-over found on STS-32, engine #2028.
Heat exchanger weld contamination (generic).
STS-31 engine #2107, Main Engine Controller Unit Number Fll
failure.
4-28
4-28
4-29
4-29
4-30
4-31
4-33
4-2 STS-31 Postflight Edition
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO
SRB
1
2
3
SECTION 4 INDEX - CONTINUED
RESOLVED STS-31 SAFETY RISK FACTORS
RISK
FACTOR
STS-31 Solid Rocket Booster aft skirt Factor of Safety.
Solid Rocket Booster Holddown Post Debris Containment System
frangible link.
Potential for unlocked pins in Instrumentation and Electronic
Assembly Deutsch block.
PAGE
4-35
4-36
4-38
SRM
1
2
3
4
STS-31 nozzle internal joint leak test investigation.
Use of Avtex restart rayon on Solid Rocket Motor components.
STS-31 potential Solid Rocket Motor thrust imbalance
Putty found on both sides of Test Evaluation Motor No. 5 inner
igniter Gask-O-Seal.
4-39
4-40
4-41
4-42
KSC
1 Momentary power outage at the Launch Control Center and Pad B
during STS-31 prelaunch activities.
4-44
PAYLOAD
1 Hubble Space Telescope transponder Radio Frequency radiation
inhibit.
4-45
GFE
1 Extravehicular Mobility Unit arm bladder exceeds life limit. 4-46
4-3 STS-31 Postflight Edition
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SECTION 5
STS-36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
OV-104/STS-36 mission, the previous Space Shuttle flight. Each anomaly is briefly
described, and risk acceptance information and rationale are provided.
5-1 STS-31 Postflight Edition
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
INTEGRATION
SECTION 5 INDEX
STS-36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
RISK
FACTOR
Engine #2027, nozzle #2027 bluing.
PAGE
5-4
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Fuel Cell #2 alternating current phase "A" inverter failure.
Liquid Hydrogen 17" disconnect "B" open indication intermittent.
Reaction Control System thruster R3D failed "off' during External
Tank separation.
Right Reaction Control System manifold #1 oxidizer isolation valve
position indication intermittent.
Left Reaction Control System 3/4/5 "B" oxidizer tank isolation valve
open position indication intermittent.
Left Reaction Control System 1/2 oxidizer crossfeed valve closed
position indication intermittent.
Water Spray Boiler #2 vent system "A" heater failed.
STS-36 Auxilia U Power Unit #1 hydraulic flex hose leak anomaly.
Cathode Ray Tube #4 screen went blank.
Oxygen bleed orifice leak.
Free water found near humidity separator "A".
Thruster R4R failed "off during pre-entry hot-fire test.
Flash Evaporator System controller "A" shutdown.
STS-36 hydraulic system depressurization anomaly.
5-5
5-5
5-6
5-7
5-7
5-8
5-9
5-10
5-17
5-18
5-18
5-19
5-19
5-20
SRB
1
2
3
4
5
6
Left Solid Rocket Booster ordinance ring pin embedded in External
Tank Attach ring foam.
Left Solid Rocket Booster frustum Main Parachute Support System
restraint strap bolt missing a nut.
Safety wire missing from Gaseous Nitrogen purge line in right-hand
aft skirt.
Left Solid Rocket Booster drogue parachute first stage reefing line
cutter failure.
Right and left Solid Rocket Booster External Tank Attach Ring found
with cable tie-wraps disengaged from electrical cable assemblies.
Right SRB frustum Marshall Trowellable Ablator No. 2 debonds.
5-24
5-25
5-25
5-26
5-27
5-28
5-2 STS-31 Postflight Edition
WLEMVNT/
SEQ. NO.
_RM
1
2
SECTION 5 INDEX - CONTINUED
STS-36 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
RISK
FACTOR
Right Solid Rocket Motor igniter/forward dome boss interface surface
metal pitting and Gask-O-Seal damage.
Secondary O-ring damage to igniter plug.
PAGE
5-29
5-33
KSC
1 Missing washer on Debris Containment System Holddown Post #6. 5-34
MCC
Space Shuttle Main Engine post-powerdown hardware failure
indicated.
5-35
5-3 STS-31 Postflight Edition
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SECTION 6
STS-33 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
STS-33 mission (previous flight of OV-103). Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk
acceptance information and rationale are provided.
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SECTION 6 INDEX
STS-33 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/ RISK
SEQ. NO. FACTOR
INTEGRATION
1 Space Shuttle Main Engine #2107 nozzle bluing.
PAGE
6-3
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
8
9
10
11
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 lube oil output pressure was high.
Cabin air leak through the Waste Collection System.
Reaction Control System FlU pressure transducer failure.
Commanders' airspeed mach indicator out of specification.
Hydraulic systems #1 and #2 accumulator ascent pressure locked-up
low.
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution Oxygen tank #1 had a
sticky Check Valve.
Forward attach point system A and system B connectors found
damaged.
"Y" Star Tracker door thermal blanket detached.
Flash Evaporator System B outlet temperature oscillation.
Erratic temperature indication from Auxiliary Power Units #1 and #3
bypass line "A".
Hydraulic system #2 Water Spray Boiler Gaseous Nitrogen leakage
was out-of-specification.
6-4
6-5
6-5
6-6
6-6
6-7
6-7
6-8
6-9
6-10
6-11
SRB
1
2
Holddown Post anomalies.
Left-hand External Tank Attachment ring Integrated Electronic
Assembly end cover and cable sooted.
6-12
6-14
KSC
1 Improper installation of cable connector assemblies. 6-15
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SECTION 7
STS-31 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
This section contains a list of Inflight Anomalies (IFAs) arising from the
OV-103/STS-31 mission. Each anomaly is briefly described, and risk acceptance
information and rationale are provided.
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SECTION 7 INDEX
STS-31 INFLIGHT ANOMALIES
ELEMENT/
SEQ. NO.
ORBITER
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
RISK
FACTOR
Auxiliary Power Unit #1 speed control failure.
Reaction Control System thruster L3A anomalies.
Supply water tank "C" bellows anomaly.
Water Spray Boiler #2 vent heater "A" did not respond on orbit.
Fuel Cell #2 Oxygen flow rate was high during purge.
Auxiliary Power Unit #3 fuel pump bypass heater "A" failed "on".
Air Data Transducer Assembly #3 circuit breaker contamination.
Missing seal material from trailing edge of elevon flipper doors #5
and #6.
PAGE
7-3
7-4
7-6
7-6
7-7
7-7
7-8
7-8
SSME
1
SRB
1
2
3
4
Engine #2031 High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump seal fragments.
Left-hand Solid Rocket Booster Integrated Electronic Assembly
dislodged at water impact.
Loose Solid Rocket Booster ordnance ring-to-frustum fastener
assemblies.
Range Safety System crossover box and cable discoloration.
Left Solid Rocket Booster aft skirt missing some Thermal Protection
System.
7-9
7-11
7-12
7-13
7-14
SRM
1 Right-hand Solid Rocket Motor nozzle cowl/outer boot ring
separation.
7-15
KSC
1 Main Propulsion System Liquid Oxygen outboard fill and drain valve
close failure.
7-17
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SECTION 8
BACKGROUND INFORMATION
This section contains pertinent background information on the safety risk factors
and anomalies addressed in Sections 3 through 7. It is intended as a supplement to
provide more detailed data if required. This section is available upon request.
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AA/OSF
AC
AD
ADTA
AFB
AMOS
APM
APU
AS
ATP
BFS
CA
Cc/sec
CEI
CR
CRES
CRT
CV
DCR
DCS
DFRC
DoD
DTO
EAFB
ECP
EDT
EMU
EPA
ES
ET
ETA
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS
Associate Administrator, Office of Space Hight
Alternating Current
Aperture Door
Air Data Transducer Assembly
Air Force Base
Air Force Maui Optical Site
Ascent Particle Monitor
Auxiliary Power Unit
Aft Shroud
Acceptance Test Procedure
Backup Hight Software
California
Cubic Centimeters Per Second
Contract End Item
Configuration End Item
Change Request
Corrosion Resistant Steel
Cathode Ray Tube
Check Valve
Design Certification Review
Debris Containment System
Dryden Flight Research Center
Department of Defense
Development Test Objective
Edwards Air Force Base
Engineering Change Proposal
Eastern Daylight Time
Extravehicular Mobility Unit
Environmental Protection Agency
Equipment Section
External Tank
External Tank Attach
External Tank Attachment
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F
FASCOS
FC
FCHL
FCL
FCS
FD
FEC
FES
FGS
FHST
FMEA/CIL
FOC
FOS
FOV
fps
FRI
FRR
FRT
FS
FSS
ft
ft-lb
GFE
GGVM
GN2
GPC
GSE
GSFC
H2
HCF
HDP
HPF
HPFTP
HPOTP
HPU
HR
hr
HRS
HST
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Fahrenheit
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Fuel Cell
Flight Control Hydraulics Laboratory
Freon Coolant Loop
Hight Control System
Hight Day
Field Engineering Change
Hash Evaporator System
Fine Guidance Sensor
Fixed Head Star Tracker
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis/Critical Items List
Faint Object Camera
Factor of Safety
Field-of-View
Feet Per Second
How Recirculation Inhibitor
Hight Readiness Review
Hight Readiness Test
Forward Shell
Flight Support System
Feet
Foot-Pound
Government Furnished Equipment
Gas Generator Valve Module
Gaseous Nitrogen
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
Goddard Space Flight Center
Hydrogen
High-Cycle Fatigue
Holddown Post
High-Pressure Fuel
High-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
High-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Hydraulic Power Unit
Hazard Report
Hour
High Resolution Spectrograph
Hubble Space Telescope
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ICBC
IEA
IFA
in-lb
in'
INTO
IPMP
IRD
JSC
KSC
L-2
lb
lb/hr
lbf
LCC
LCF
LH
LH2
LO2
LOX
LPFTP
LPOTP
LPS
LS
LSFR
MCC
ME
MEC
MECO
MFV
min
MLP
MOC
MPS
MPSS
MRB
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
IMAX Cargo Bay Camera
Integrated Electronic Assembly
Instrument and Electronic Assembly
Inflight Anomaly
Inch-Pound
Cubic Inch
Integration
Investigations into Polymer Membrane Processing
Integrated Receiver/Decoder
Johnson Space Center
Kennedy Space Center
Launch Minus 2 Days (Review)
Pound
pounds per hour
Pounds Force
Launch Commit Criteria
Launch Control Center
Low-Cycle Fatigue
Left-Hand
Liquid Hydrogen
Liquid Oxygen
Liquid Oxygen
Low-Pressure Fuel Turbopump
Low-Pressure Oxidizer Turbopump
Launch Process Sequencer
Light Shield
Launch Site Flow Review
Main Combustion Chamber
Mission Control Center
Main Engine
Main Engine Controller
Main Engine Cutoff
Main Fuel Valve
Minute
Mobile Launch Platform
Mission Operations Center
Mission Operational Computer
Main Propulsion System
Main Parachute Support Structure
Material Review Board
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MSE
msec
MSFC
MTA
MTA-2
N,O,
NASA
NCR
NLG
nmi
NSLD
NSRS
0 2
OI
OMI
OMRSD
OMS
OPF
OPO
OPOV
ORBI
ORU
OSMQ
OTA
OV
P/N
PCG
PCV
PFS
ppm
PR
PRCB
PRSD
psi
psi/hr
psia
psid
psig
QC
QD
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Mission Safety Evaluation
Millisecond
Marshall Space Flight Center
Marshall Trowellable Ablator
Marshall Trowellable Ablator No. 2
Nitrogen Tetroxide
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Noncompliance Report
Nose Landing Gear
Nautical Mile
NASA Shuttle Logistics Depot
NASA Safety Reporting System
Oxygen
Operational Instrumentation
Operations and Maintenance Instruction
Operational Maintenance Requirements and Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Orbiter Processing Facility
Orbiter Project Office
Oxidizer Preburner Oxidizer Valve
Orbiter
Orbital Replaceable Unit
Office of Safety and Mission Quality
Optical Telescope Assembly
Orbiter Vehicle
Part Number
Protein Crystal Growth
Pulse Control Valve
Primary Flight Software
Parts Per Million
Problem Report
Program Requirements Control Board
Power Reactant Storage and Distribution
Pounds Per Square Inch
Pounds
Pounds
Pounds
Pounds
Per Square Inch/Hour
Per Square Inch Absolute
Per Square Inch Differential
Per Square Inch Gage
Quality Control
Quick Disconnect
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APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
RCS
RF
RGA
RH
RI
RM
RME
RMS
RSRM
RSS
RSU
RTLS
SIN
SA
$¢¢m
sdm
SE
sec
SI
SOV
SR&QA
SRB
SRM
SSM
SSME
SSRP
SSV
TAL
TEM
TPMS
TPS
TPTA
TSM
TWX
U/N
UPS
USBI
Reaction Control System
Radio Frequency
Rate Gyro Assembly
Right-Hand
Rockwell International
Redundancy Management
Radiation Monitoring Equipment
Remote Manipulator System
Redesigned Solid Rocket Motor
Range Safety System
Rate Sensor Unit
Return-to-Launch Site
Serial Number
Solar Array
Standard Cubic Centimeters Per Minute
Standard Cubic Feet Per Minute
Student Experiment
Second
Scientific Instrument
Shutoff Valve
Safety, Reliability, and Quality Assurance
Solid Rocket Booster
Solid Rocket Motor
Support System Module
Space Shuttle Main Engine
System Safety Review Panel
Space Shuttle Vehicle
Transatlantic Abort Landing
Test and Evaluation Motor
Tire Pressure Measurement System
Thermal Protection System
Transient Pressure Test Article
Tail Service Mast
Teletype Wire Transmission
Unit Number
Uninterruptable Power Supply
United Space Boosters, Inc.
A-5 STS-31 Postflight Edition
V/m
VAB
VAC
WCS
WF/PC
WPAFB
WSB
WWMS
APPENDIX A
LIST OF ACRONYMS - CONTINUED
Volts/Meters
Vehicle Assembly Building
Volts Alternating Current
Waste Collection System
Wide Field/Planetary Camera
Wright Patterson Air Force Base
Water Spray Boiler
Waste Water Management System
A-6 STS-31 Postflight Edition
